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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 8877

-vs.COURTESY MOTORS, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, Courtesy Motors, Inc., substantially
agrees with the statement of facts contained in the brief
of appellant, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, with
the following exceptions and additions:
1
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The transaction out of which this case arises involves
Goffe Motor Company, an automobile dealer in Pueblo,
Colorado, Dick A. Channel, the purchaser of the vehicle,
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, the appellant and
purchaser of the contract of sale, and Courtesy :Motors,
Inc., the respondent and subsequent purchaser of the vehicle from Dick A. Channel. For convenience the parties
will hereinafter be referred to as "Goffe," "Channel,"
"C.I. T." and "Courtesy," respectively.
The deal for the purchase of the automobile by
Channel from Goffe was made November 26, 1957. (R. 25)
Instead of receiving on November 27, 1956, a down payment as represented to C.I.T. on the contract (Ex. P-1),
Goffe had in fact only received a post-dated check in the
amount of $853.85. (R. 49)
On December 1, 1956, Channel picked up the automobile in question and Goffe delivered to him all the docuInents necessary to permit him to obtain title to the autoInobile in his own name, free and clear of all encumbrances. (R. 39)
There is no evidence that Goffe ~fotor Cmnpany
gave any instructions whatsoever to Channel with reference to his recording the mortgage.
Subsequent to December 1, 1956, and prior to Deceinber 7, 1956, Goffe forwarded its contract with Channel to C.I.T. for purchase by C.I.T. (R. ±7)
2
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Two or three days after December 1, 1956, Goffe
learned fron1 the Firestone Company, where Channel was
supposed to be mnployed, that Channel had skipped town
and that the Firestone Company had found discrepancies in its own books which had been handled by Channel.
(R. 45, 46) On Dece1nber 7, 1956, Goffe called the C.I.T.
office to find out what it should do about the Channel
transaction, at which time C.I.T. recommended that Goffe
file the Channel mortgage of record. ( R. 50)
The automobile was subsequently purchased by
Courtesy from Channel. E1nployees of Courtesy \vho
handled the transaction did not have any actual knmvledge of any outstanding 1nortgage on the vehicle and did
not recognize that the bill of sale to the same (Ex. P-2)
had been cut in two. (R. 83-85)
The attempted recordation of the 1nortgage in no
wise complied with the provisions of Section 13 (19)
Chapter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated
(1953 Cum. Supp.). (Ex. D-8) It has never been claimed
by C.I.T. that Courtesy had constructive notice of the
mortgage by virtue of the recording.
C.I.T. has merely contended that Courtesy had implied notice of its mortgage by reason of being put upon
a duty of inquiry regarding the same, because of the mutilation of the bill of sale, Ex. 2. (R. 18)
The automobile in question is in Salt Lake City and
available for a mortgage foreclosure proceeding as well
as the person who purchased the same from Courtesy.

(R. 8, 9)
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, COURTESY OWED NO DUTY TO C.I.T. WHICH
COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S ACTION
IN TORT.
POINT II.
COURTESY, AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE IN
QUESTION WAS SOLD TO CHANNEL, HAD NO NOTICE,
ACTUAL OR IMPLIED, OF ANY EQUITY OF C.I.T. IN THE
SAID AUTOMOBILE. ON THIS ISSUE REASONABLE
MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AND THE TRIAL COURT
WAS JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
POINT III.
IF THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE
RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED NOTICE OF THE INTEREST OF
C.I.T. IN THE SAID AUTOMOBILE WERE SUCH THAT
REASON ABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, THEN THE QUESTION OF IMPLIED NOTICE IS NOT ONE FOR THE COURT
BUT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY.
POINT IV.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT COURTESY HAS DESTROYED ANY SECURITY INTEREST OF C.I.T. IN THE
AUTOMOBILE.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, COURTESY OWED NO DUTY TO C.I.T. WHICH
·COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S ACTION
IN TORT.

In selling the automobile to Channel, Goffe failed to
follow the statutory procedures by which it could have
protected itself and any_ assignee of the mortgage executed by Channel. Having bungled the transaction and
permitted itself to be deceived by Channel, Goffe, has
sought to pass the resulting damage to Courtesy. The deal
with Channel was dosed on X ovember 27, 1956. (R. 25)
Channel took possession of the autmnobile on December
1, 1956, and received all of the documents needed by him
to apply for title in his own name, free and clear of all
encumbrances. ( R. 39)
Goffe made no effort whatsoever to see that a new
title was issued in Channel's name evidencing the mortgage to either Goffe Motor Con1pany or appellant. Had
Goffe followed the provisions of Section 13 (19) of Chapter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1953,
Cumulative. Supplement (Ex. D-8), this case would never
have arisen. Channel would not have been in a position
to deceive any one. He would never have received in his
own hands the means of securing a clear title to the automobile, free from all encumbrances. Goffe would have
presented the documents to the proper county official
contemplated in said Section 13(19) and in due course
a new title would have issued to Channel, showing the lien
in favor of appellant.

5
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John A. Wilson, the general n1anager of Goffe (R.
24) ad1nitted at the trial that Goffe has now changed its
procedure to comply with the statutory requirements and
thereby protect the interests of the finance company involved. (R. 58)
·

In addition, Goffe on N ove~nber 27, 1956, accepted a
post-dated check from Channel. (R. 49) The company
purported to assign the mortgage executed by Channel to
C.I.T., representing that the down payment as indicated
had been made, when, in fact, it had nothing but a promise
to pay evidenced by the post-dated check. (Ex. D-6, R. 49)

\Vhen Channel left the state it becan1e impossible
to· record the mortgage in such a manner as to give constructive notire thereof to any subsequent purchaser of
the vehicle. The above mentioned Section 13(19) could not
be complied with. At that time, neither Goffe nor C.I.T.
could comply with the provisions of Section 13(19) of
Chapter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Anotated. That
section sets forth in detail the procedure to be followed
by the holder of any chattel n1ortgage on the n1otor vehicle desiring to secure to hin1self the· protective rights
afforded. No clai1n has eYer been 1nade that Courtesy had
constructi're notice of the 1nortgage elai1ned by ·C.I.T. by
virtue of the ineffectual recording thereof. C.I.T. has
1nerely claiined that Courtesy had im,plied notice of the
sarne by reason of being put upon a duty of inquiry because of a vprv artful n1utilation of the bill of sale. (R.
18)

6
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A study of testimony adduced at the trial makes it
aparent that C.I.T. is actually not the party in interest.
While it is claimed it paid $2,000.00 for the Channel
mortgage, it is evident that Goffe misrepresented the
transaction and the document to the appellant by stating
that it had received a down payment of $853.85, and that
the transaction was recorded as a legal transaction and
that title would issue showing C.r.rr. as lien-holder. (I1Jx.
P-1) Wilson hedged when asked about repayment to appellant (R. 50-51), and never did say that Goffe wmtld not
refund the $2,000.00 to the appellant.
This is a case where Goffe b~~ its own negligent conduct made it possible for Channel to deceive Courtesy.
Had Goffe exercised the ordinary and reasonable care
becoming a dealer in motor vehicles and complied with the
statutory requirements for filing the 1nortgage of record,
neither the appellant nor the respondent would have
been injured.
Courtesy had no contractual relationship with Goffe
or C.I.T. and no knowledge whatsoever of the mortgage.
This is an action in tort. What duty did Courtesy owe
to Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation 1
POINT II.
COURTESY, AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE IN
QUESTION WAS SOLD TO CHANNEL, HAD NO NOTICE,
ACTUAL OR IMPLIED, OF ANY EQUITY OF C.I.T. IN THE
SAID AUTOMOBILE. ON THIS ISSUE REASONABLE
MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AND THE TRIAL COURT
WAS JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

7
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A comparison of the bill of sale from Goffe to Channel, Exhibit P -2, which was delivered to Courtesy, and
Exhibit P-3, the con1plete Colorado form, indicates that
Exhibit P -2 has been very skillfully and artfully cut in
two. In granting the motion of Courtesy for a directed
verdict, the trial judge in effect held that the evidence
was such that reasonable minds could not differ in believing that Courtesy had no actual notice of any interest of
C.I.T. in the vehicle, and in believing that the cutting
of Exhibit 2 was so skillful that any reasonable person
would be deceived.

As already noted, there was no such recordation in
compliance \\'ith the statutory requirements of Colorado
as to give constructive notice to any third party of the
outstanding mortgage on the vehicle. See again the requirements of Section 13(19) of Chapter 16 of the 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated (1953 Cumulative Supplement). An examination of said Exhibit P -2 reveals how
skilfully the instru1nent was cut, so as to ren1ove any
and all trace of the lien information.
A person trained in the law and skilled in the use of
legal verbiage 1night recognize the incmnpleteness of
Exhibit P -2, but those who handled the documents were
not so trained. The evidence shows, however, that those
who handled the instrun1ent were without exception de-

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ceived by what had been done. Randy Larson, an experienced salesman for Courtesy, knew only the bare requirements for a valid bill of sale. He had never seen
such a Colorado document before. He thought the instrument contained the requisites of a valid bill of sale. He
did not know the precise wording of the same, and assumed it was sufficient. He was looking for names, signatures and a notarization. (R. 84, 85)
Scott Thorne, an mnployee of the State Tax Commission, also had occasion to pass on the sufficiency of the
bill of sale. He testified that title documents are always
examined to determine the validity of the title of the applicant, and that these documents were passed upon and
accepted by him and the vehicle thereupon retitled in the
name of Courtesy. (R. 99, 100)
These trained and experienced personnel were misled and deceived by Exhibit P-2. ~one of them noticed
that the lien information had been severed therefrom.
The trial court was fully justified in view of such Pvidence in concluding that reasonable minds could not
differ in believing that any reasonable person would be
fooled thereby. The respondent's motion for a directed
verdict was properly granted.
POINT III.
IF THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE
RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED NOTICE OF THE INTEREST OF
C.I.T. IN THE SAID AUTOMOBILE WERE SUCH THAT
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, THEN THE QUESTION OF IMPLIED NOTICE IS NOT ONE FOR THE COURT
BUT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY.

9
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It is aximnatic that when facts are uncontradicted,
or where but one conclusion or inference is reasonably
possible from the evidence so that reasonable minds would
draw the same conclusions therefrom, the question becomes one of law for the trial court. See 88 C.J.S. Trial,
Sec. 210; Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 Utah
273, 37 P. (2d) 362; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Ctah 503, 56
P. (2d) 1.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretion in
granting the respondent's motion to direct a verdict in its
favor should not be disturbed unless such discretion has
been abused. 5-A C.tT.S. Appeal and Error, Sec. 1612,
p. 117.
If the evidence regarding the transaction between
Channel and Courtesy ~fotors, Inc., were such that reasonable men might differ in their belief as to whether
Courtesy was put on a duty of inqury, the case should
have been sent to the jury.
Counsel for C.I.T. contends in his brief at page 16
that
". . . the question of sufficiency of the notice
required to reasonably put a person on inqury is a
n1atter of law to be decided by the court."
The appellant, C.I.T., on this appeal is asking the
Court to reverse the trial court and enter a judgn1ent in
it~ favor. The evidence in this case justifies no such re-

lief for all "·ho handled Exhibit P-2 were deceived. X ow,
10
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if the evidence is such that reasonable minds 1night differ
in their conclusion, the question of 'vhether Courtesy
had actual notice, or whether the notice it had was sufficient to put it on a duty of inquiry, is ordinarii~, a question of fact for the jury to decide. The general rule is
stated in 9:2 C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 37 4, p. 309:
309:
". . . where the evidence is such that only one
conclusion may reasonably be drawn therefrom,
the question is for the court, and in such a case it
is error for the court to sub1nit the question to the
jury. However, questions of fact as to which there
is a conflict in the evidence, or the evidence is such
that different inferences might reasonably be
drawn therefrom, are ordinarily for the jury
under proper instructions. Thus, the questions of
whether one was an innocent purchaser, bona
fides, adequacy of consideration, possession, notice, whether the purchaser was put on inquiry,
and whether inquiry would have resulted in notice,
are ordinarily for the jury."
See also 1l1cCarthy v. Lane, 16 X.E. (2d) 683 CI\Iass.
1938); Walker v. ilfackey, 253 P. (2d) 280 (Ore. 1953);
Three Six'ty Five Clttb v. 8lwslak, :232 P. (2d) 546 (Cal.

1951).
Certainly there was no basis for appellant's motion
for a directed verdict, for without exception everyone
that handled the bill of sale, Exhibit P-2, was deeeived by

11
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the artful cutting of the docu1nent. The trial court was,
therefore, justified in denying appellant's 1notion for a
directed verdict and in directing a verdict for respondent,
Courtesy.
However, even if the discretion of the trial court
were abused in this matter, the appellant's motion should
not be granted, but in that event the case, in accordance
with the authorities cited, should normally be sent to the
jury upon appropriate instructions, except for the reasons set forth in Point No. IV.
POINT IV.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT COURTESY HAS DESTROYED ANY SECURITY INTEREST OF C.I.T. IN THE
AUTOMOBILE.

The appellant, C.I. T ., has based its action upon the
premise that Courtesy has destroyed an alleged security
interest in the automobile in question. See Paragraphs
6 and 7 of plaintiff'~ con1plaint. (R. 2) Assuming that the
appellant had a valid security interest in the vehicle,
wherein has the same been destroyed by Courtesy 1
There is no question that the respondent, Courtesy
purchased the automobile in question from Channel. That
fact is admitted. But that does not of itself destroy any
equity that C.I.T. may have had in the automobile. See
United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79 (District Ct., D. :Minnesota, 1941), Appeal dismissed 121 F.
(2d) 1019; .11 idland Nat. Rank & Trnst Co. Y. Peterso11,
281 N.\\'. ()~3 (\ri~., 1938); L()/{dcn Y. Cooper, 100 P. (2d)
42 (Wash., 1940).
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Courtesy, in its Answers to Interrogatories ~ o. G,
(R. 8), has advised C.I.T. that the automobile was subsequently sold to one Lavell Witney, 155 Second A venue,
Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 12, 1957. Even this
additional fact does not constitute any destruction of the
security interest of C.I.T. in the vehicle and give rise to
a cause of action. See United States v. Rogers & Rogers,
supra; Midland Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Petersen,
supra; Louden v. Cooper, supra.

"It is elementary that before a tort ean be
committed there must be an invasion of a legal
right. •*•
". . . neither the sale by the Inortgagor of
property subject to a chattel n1ortgage nor a
subsequent sale by his vendee constitute conversion of the property described in the chattelinortgage." United States v. Rogers & Rogers, supra.
Has the automobile itself been destroyed~ No. Has
the mortgage of C.I.T. (assuming its validity) been destroyed'? No, it was admitted in evidence. (I':x. P-1) Dot>s
the security interest in the automobile arising from the
mortgage still exist in favor of C.I.T. ~ Certainly, unless
cut off by a bona fide purchaser.

The only possible way that any security interest of
C.I. T. would be destroyed in this case is through a purchase of the automobile by a bona fide purchaser. But if

13
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Courtesy is such a purchaser, as it so claiins to be, then
there can be no cause of action against Courtesy. 92
C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 367, p. 300. On the other
hand, if Lavell Whitney purchased the vehicle subject to
the 1nortgage or knew of the same and was thus not a
bona fide purchaser-and there is no evidence that such
is not the case -then there is no reason why the appellant could not foreclose its chattel mortgage and be made
whole. No security interest of C.I.T. would be destroyed.
It is ele1nentary that C.I.T., as plaintiff in this action,
assu1nes the burden of proving its case. If it has a valid
mortgage there is nothing to show that it cannot now
proceed to foreclose the san1e. Until C.I.T. has made such
an effort, and it is shown that its security interest in the
automobile i0 destroyed as alleged, there is no showing
that it has suffered any damage whatsoever at the hands
of ·Courtesy. Until the vehicle has been placed beyond
the reach of C.I.T. it cannot cmnplain of injury. Louden
v. Cooper, supra.
These circun1stances alone were justification enough
for the trial court to grant the respondent's n1otion for
a directed verdict.
Sl~:MnlAR.Y

In sun11nary. Courtesy :Motors. Ine., contends that
dmnage to C.I. T. resulting in this case is due to the
bungling, negligent conduct of Goffe. It is doubtful that
C.LT. is even tlw real party in interest. In any event,
Courtesy :Motors, Inc., is a bona fide purchaser of the
autmnobile and was therefore justified in re-selling the
an~~

14
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same. It had no constructive notice of any mortgage in
favor of C.I.T. nor was Courtesy ~lotors, Inc., put on
any duty of inqury by reason of the cutting of the original
bill of sale 1£x. P-2. On this latter issue, the Court was
justified in concluding that reasonable minds would not
differ.
If the trial court abused its discretion and reasonable
minds would differ as to the existence of Courtesy's
duty of further inquiry, then the ease normally should
have gone to the jury upon appropriate instructions, except, however, that even if Courtesy had a duty of inquiry
and in the exercise of that duty would have discovered
the mortgage in favor of C.I. T., still, there has been no
destruction of any security interest of C.I.T. in the vehicle. The automobile and its last purchaser are in Salt
Lake City, Utah. C.I.T. can, if it has a valid mortgage,
proceed to foreclose the same.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Mc~Y

& BURTON

I«~/fP'-C.{;

BY--------------------------------------------------~
MACOY

A.

McMuRRAY

_

(

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent) Courtesy Motors)

Inc.
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

